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Chapter 1
Introduction





Seek ye epistemic freedom first
Epistemic Freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and Decolonization is a study of the
politics of knowledge in general and specifically of African struggles for epistemic
freedom. As a result of the long-term consequences of modernity, enslavement
and colonialism, African people have been reproduced as agents in a Eurocentric
history. What exist today as conventional ‘philosophy of history’ and academic
discourse of history produced within modern universities is still normatively
Eurocentric, neo-Enlightenment, neo-Hegelian, neo-Marxist, neo-modernist 
and Habermasian. In this context thought about historical change is still hostage
to resilient linear social-evolutionary notions of ‘transitional’ shifts (Bhambra 
2007: 24).
A major consequence of this Eurocentric thinking is that what is today known
as ‘African history’ has been ‘subsumed to the ideological parameters and
periodization of the general framework, be it colonial, nationalist, or Marxist’
(Bhambra 2007: 25). This point was delivered more emphatically by Dipesh
Chakrabarty (2007: 27) when he argued: ‘ “Europe” remains the sovereign, theor -
etical subject of all histories, including the ones we call “Indian,” “Chinese,”
“Kenyan,” and so on.’ It was perhaps this reality that provoked the African his -
torian E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo (2002: 14) to pose the question: ‘Can African
historians recapture this historical space and reintroduce an African philosophy of
history that emphasizes African autonomy?’ Atieno-Odhiambo (2002) pushed for
a paradigm shift ‘from African historiographies to an African philosophy of history’.
In an earlier publication, Atieno-Odhiambo (1996: 31) eloquently expressed the
epistemic quandary haunting the so-called ‘African history’:
Has the time come to question the unitary acceptance of the hegemonic
episteme which posits that the discipline of history uniquely belongs to
Western civilization? Alternatively, can Africans articulate an African gnosis
that stands independently of these western traditions in our study of African
history? Need African epistemes be intelligible to the West? Need the study
and practice of history be tied to the guild of historical study at the
universities? Is there still the lingering possibility than any one of us working
within the western mode can have the arterial bypass surgery that may still
be the viaduct upstream to the African reservoir of history?
At another level, Amy Allen (2016: 44) correctly critiqued Eurocentric notions
of ‘macrohistory’ in these revealing words: ‘If global unity and capacity to make
history are themselves historical developments that have emerged relatively recently,
then they cannot be made the premises of an understanding of history as a whole.’
Hence the urgent need for epistemic freedom, which restores to African people a
central position within human history as independent actors. This epistemological
concern is fundamentally decolonial. As a people, Africans were always there in
human history. They were never creatures of ‘discovery’. Africans were always
present (‘presence Africaine’). Africans were never absent. Africa was never a
tabula rasa (Dark Continent). Africans always had their own valid, legitimate and
useful knowledge systems and education systems. This is the decolonial tale at the
centre of this book. The foundation of this decolonial tale is well articulated by
the Wole Soyinka who had this to say about Africa:
The African continent appears to possess one distinction that is largely
unremarked. Unlike the Americas or Australasia, for instance, no one actually
claims to have ‘discovered’ Africa. Neither the continent as an entity nor
indeed any of her later offspring – the modern states – celebrates the
equivalent of America’s Columbus Day. This gives it a self-constitutive
identity, an unstated autochthony that is denied other continents and
subcontinents. [. . .] Africa appears to have been ‘known about’, speculated
over, explored both in actuality and fantasy, even mapped – Greeks, Jews,
Arabs, Phoenicians, etc., took their turns – but no narrative has come down
to us that actually lays personal claim to the discovery of the continent.
Ancient ruins, the source of a river, mountain peaks, exotic kingdoms, and
sunken pyramids, yes, but not the continent itself – as in the case of the
Americas. Hundreds have ventured into, explored, and extensively theorized
over the continent, but no one has actually claimed to have discovered her.
(Soyinka 2012: 27)
Soyinka challenged the colonial paradigm of ‘discovery’ and highlighted Africa’s
primordial existence. This means that Africa has a long history that pre-dated its
encounter with Europe. It also means that such a primordial entity had and has its
own rich knowledge that kept it alive. What is explored in this book is not only
how Africa in particular and the rest of the Global South in general became
victims of genocides, epistemicides, linguicide and cultural imperialism, but also
the trajectories of struggles for epistemic freedom that were provoked and ensued.
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Thus, conceptually speaking, the book delves deeper into such concepts as ‘the
epistemic line’ as the problem of the twenty-first century; the perennial problem
of ‘silences’ of African voices and problematic African archives enabled by the
‘Europeanization’ of the world on the one hand and the subalternization of Africa
on the other hand; and the imperative of ‘rethinking thinking’ during the current
age of epistemic and systemic crisis.
The epistemic line
If the ‘colour line’ was indeed the major problem of the twentieth century as
articulated by William E. B. Du Bois (1903), then that of the twenty-first century
is the ‘epistemic line’. The ‘epistemic line’ cascades from the ‘colour line’ because
denial of humanity automatically disqualified one from epistemic virtue. The
epistemic line is sustained by what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007) termed
‘abyssal thinking’ – an imperial reason that reduced some human beings to a sub-
human category with no knowledge. This means that the epistemic line is
simultaneously the ontological line.
Thus the triple processes of provincializing Europe, deprovincializing Africa
and epistemological decolonization which frame this book constitute a drive for a
restorative epistemic agenda and process that simultaneously addresses ontological
and epistemological issues haunting Africa. The definitive entry of descendants of
the enslaved, displaced, colonized and racialized peoples into the existing academies
across the world, proclaiming loudly that they are human beings, their lives matter,
and that they were born into valid and legitimate knowledge systems, enabled the
resurgence of long-standing struggles for epistemic freedom. Thus epistemic
freedom speaks to cognitive justice. Epistemic freedom is fundamentally about the
right to think, theorize, interpret the world, develop own methodologies and
write from where one is located and unencumbered by Eurocentrism. Samir Amin
(2009) depicted Eurocentrism as one of the great ideological deformation of our
time. Epistemic justice is about liberation of reason itself from coloniality.
Africa is one of those epistemic sites that experienced not only colonial genocides
but also ‘theft of history’ (see Goody 2006), epistemicides (killing of indigenous
people’s knowledges) and linguicides (killing of indigenous people’s languages)
(see Ngugi wa Thiong’o 2009a; Ngugi wa Thiong’o 2009b). Therefore, African
people’s epistemic struggles are both old and new. They are old in the sense that
they emerged at the very time of colonial encounters. They are new in the sense
that they are re-emerging within a context of a deep present global systemic and
epistemic crisis. What is projected here is epistemological decolonization as a
double task of ‘provincializing Europe’ and ‘deprovincializing Africa’. The processes
of ‘provincializing’ and ‘deprovincializing’ are inextricably linked as they speak to
how what appears on a global scale as European thought could be claimed as
human heritage rather than a thought from one geographical centre. ‘Provincial -
izing’ is a process of ‘moving the centre’ to borrow a concept from Ngugi wa
Thiong’o (1993). ‘Moving the centre’ is understood in a double-sense:
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I am concerned with moving the centre in two senses at least. One is the
need to move the centre from its assumed location in the West to a
multiplicity of spheres in all the cultures of the world. The assumed location
of the centre of the universe in the West is what goes by the term
Eurocentrism [. . .] The second sense is even more important [. . .]. Within
nearly all nations today the centre is located in the dominant social stratum,
a male bourgeois minority. [. . .] Moving the centre in the two senses –
between nations and within nations – will contribute to the freeing of the
world of cultures from the restrictive walls of nationalism, class, race and
gender.
(Ngugi wa Thiong’o 1993: xvi–xvii).
In this sense, ‘provincializing Europe’ is meant to confront the problem of
overrepresentation of European thought in knowledge, social theory and education,
which resulted in what the European historian John M. Headly (2008) celebrated
as ‘the Europeanization of the World’. To ‘provincialize Europe’ is fundamentally
to ‘de-Europeanize’ the world. De-Europeanization of the world entails what
Kuan-Hsing Chen (2010) depicted as ‘deimperialization’. Chen (2010: vii) defined
deimperialization as movement that demanded (ex)-imperial powers to genuinely
reflect on ‘their imperial histories and the harmful impacts those have had on the
world’. This is a fundamental decolonial demand of which political decolonization
of the twentieth century failed to deliver. The process of ‘de-Europeanizing’ is
here rendered as ‘deprovincializing Africa’ – an intellectual and academic process
of centring of Africa as a legitimate historical unit of analysis and epistemic site
from which to interpret the world while at the same time globalizing knowledge
from Africa. Such a move constitutes epistemic freedom as that essential pre-
requisite for political, cultural, economic and other freedoms.
Epistemic freedom is different from academic freedom. Academic freedom
speaks to institutional autonomy of universities and rights to express diverse ideas
including those critical of authorities and political leaders. Epistemic freedom is
much broader and deeper. It speaks to cognitive justice; it draws our attention to
the content of what it is that we are free to express and on whose terms. Cognitive
justice as defined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) is premised on recognition
of diverse ways of knowing by which human beings across the globe make sense
of their existence. Epistemic freedom is about democratizing ‘knowledge’ from its
current rendition in the singular into its plural known as ‘knowledges’. It is also
ranged against overrepresentation of Eurocentric thought in knowledge, social
theory and education. Epistemic freedom is foundational in the broader decolon -
ization struggle because it enables the emergence of the necessary critical decolonial
consciousness.
In Africa, decolonization has generally been understood to have begun with
‘political decolonization’ predicated on seeking the ‘political kingdom first’.
However, the current struggles for epistemic freedom have provoked a need for
rethinking of the decolonial trajectories. While it is true that political, economic,
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cultural and epistemological aspects of decolonization were and are always
inextricably intertwined, we have to be cognisant of the fact that the ‘sequencing’
arose from a practical strategic logic of struggles against colonialism, which
privileged attainment of political sovereignty first. In the co-constitution of political,
economic, cultural and epistemological decolonization, epistemic freedom should
form the base because it deals with the fundamental issues of critical consciousness
building, which are essential pre-requisites for both political and economic freedom.
This point was highlighted by E. Mveng (1983: 141): ‘if political sovereignty is
necessary, the scientific sovereignty is perhaps more important in present-day
Africa’. Mveng (1983: 141) elaborated that ‘The West agrees with us today that
the way to Truth passes by numerous paths, other than Aristolean Thomistic logic
or Hegelian dialectics. But social and human sciences themselves must be
decolonized’. Paulin J. Hountondji (1996: 107) also emphasized the need for
epistemic freedom when he argued that:
We must be ambitious for Africa and for ourselves; we must be careful not
to nip in the bud the unparalleled promise of our history or to prune it
prematurely. We must on the contrary open it up, liberate it [. . .]. Beyond
all facile solutions, beyond all myths, we must have courage to make a fresh
start.
Hountondji (2002: 103) went on to articulate some of the key aspect of the
African struggles for epistemic freedom:
The struggle against intellectual extraversion presupposes the creation, in
Africa, of an autonomous space for reflection and theoretical discussion that
is indissolubly philosophical and scientific. Only such a space can enhance
an effective participation of African peoples – and not just some individuals
of African origin – in the debates about them. That will be the condition
for intellectual freedom.
But in the search for epistemic freedom, knowledge cannot be reduced to
‘philosophical’ and ‘scientific’ forms only. Recognition of various forms of
knowledge and knowing is called for in decolonization. Hountondji (2002: 104)
elaborated that the task of epistemic freedom is ‘that of organizing in Africa an
autonomous debate that will no longer be a far-flung appendix to European
debates, but which will directly pit African philosophers against one another’. 
To Hountondji (2002: 139), the base for sustainable epistemic freedom lies in
formulation of ‘original set of questions’ and he elaborated on this point this way:
The creation of an autonomous body of thought had to begin with the
effort to formulate original set of questions, not out of a search for novelty
for its own sake, but out of a concern for authenticity, of a desire to be
oneself by freely asking questions that one spontaneously asks oneself and by
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trying to raise them to a higher level of formulation, rather than by passively
accepting the questions that others ask themselves or ask us from their own
preoccupations.
What is also necessary for the success of epistemic freedom according to
Hountondji (2002: 139) is the ‘change of audience’ by African researchers ‘to con -
sider his or her African public as his or her prime target’. All these moves speak
to the necessary processes of deprovincializing Africa and ‘provincializing Europe’.
Suffice to say deprovincializing Africa addresses marginality and peripherality of
Africa in the knowledge and education domain through recentring it. Chakrabarty,
who introduced and popularized the concept of ‘provincializing Europe’, seemed
to be concerned about how the ‘Restern world’ could claim what has been known
as European ideas and thought. This is indeed another important way of subverting
and confronting the problem of Eurocentrism as an enabler of Western epistemic
hegemony. Chakrabarty (2000: xiv) highlighted how ‘universalistic thought was
always and already modified by particular histories’.
While this is indeed a valid intervention, there is still the need to stretch the
concept of ‘provincializing Europe’ into a decolonial perspective where it has to
directly address the problem of ‘coloniality of knowledge’ which took the form
of ‘invasion of the mental universe’ of the colonized world (see Ngugi wa Thiong’o
1986; Quijano 2007). This analysis takes us to the concept of epistemological
decolonization, which is meant to deal with problems and consequences of the
‘metaphysical empire’ such epistemicides, linguicides, cultural imperialism and
alienation. At the centre of epistemic freedom is demythologizing of both the idea
of Europe as a teacher of the world and the idea of Africa as a pupil (Ngugi wa
Thiong’o 1986). With specific reference to demythologizing Africa, Hountondji
posited that:
The search for intellectual freedom presupposes a ‘demythologizing’ of the
idea of Africa. The ‘dominant, mythological conception of Africanness’ had
to be demolished, and re-established the simple, obvious truth that Africa is
above all a continent, and the concept of Africa an empirical and geographical
concept and not a metaphysical one’.
(Hountondji 2002: 126)
Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff (2012: 1) also highlighted a decolonial
epistemological move of decentring the Global North as the centre of know-
ledge and recentring the Global South. This is how they pondered on this
deprovincializing strategy:
But what if, and here is the idea in interrogative form, we invert that order
of things? What if we subvert the epistemic scaffolding on which it is
erected? What if we posit that, in the present moment, it is the global south
that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at large?
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The Comaroffs posited these key epistemological questions as part of pushing
for deprovincializing the ‘Global South’ within a historical and epistemic context
in which ‘Western enlightenment thought has [. . .] posited itself as the wellspring
of universal learning, of Science and Philosophy [. . .], it has regarded the non-
West – variously known as the ancient, the orient, the primitive world, the third
world, the underdeveloped world, the developing world, and now the global
south – primarily as a place of parochial wisdom, of antiquarian traditions, of
exotic ways and means’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012: 1). It is within this terrain
that the current assertions of epistemic freedom emerged but they became
accentuated in the twenty-first century because the ‘Global North’ ‘after five
centuries of “teaching” the world, it lost the capacity to learn from the experience
of the world’ (Santos 2014: 19). This inability of the ‘Global North’ to learn from
the rest of the world emerged from invented white supremacy that underpinned
colonialism and imperialism (Santos 2014: 19). It has delivered a double crisis –
systemic and epistemic.
It was during the heydays of colonialism that Africa was reinvented as a site of
‘darkness’ bereft of any knowledge beyond superstitions. But the reality of today
is that what has existed as ‘Western, Eurocentric critical tradition’ is exhibiting
clear signs of exhaustion (Santos 2014: 19). The exhaustion manifests itself in
various forms that Santos (2014: 19) summarized as: ‘irrelevance, inadequacy,
impotence, stagnation, paralysis’. The epistemic crisis is also expressing itself in
terms of what Santos (2014: 33) depicted as ‘loss of critical nouns’. He elaborated
that:
There was a time when Eurocentric critical theory ‘owned’ a vast set of
nouns that marked its difference from conventional or bourgeois theories.
These nouns included socialism, communism, revolution, class struggle,
dependency, alienation, fetishism of commodities, and so on. In the past
thirty years the Eurocentric critical tradition seems to have lost ‘its’ nouns
and now distinguishes itself from conventional or bourgeois theories by 
the adjectives it uses to subvert the meaning of the proper nouns it bor-
rows from such theories. Thus, for instance, if conventional theory speaks 
of develop ment, critical theory refers to alternative, integral, inclusionary,
demo cratic, or sustainable development; if conventional theory speaks 
of dem oc racy, critical theory proposes radical, participatory, or deliberative
dem oc racy.
(Santos 2014: 33)
At another level, such African leading philosophers as Hountondji (1997) 
have noted that, even though today, mainly because of globalization, there is
increasing talk of a global economy of knowledge, such globalized knowledge still
has an identifiable centre from which it cascades and circulates. That centre is
Europe and North America. A long-standing asymmetrical division of intellectual
labour sustains epistemic hegemony. In this context African scholars have largely
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functioned as ‘hunter-gatherers’ of raw data as well as ‘native informants’. Europe
and North America have remained sites of processing of raw data into concepts
and theories. These concepts and theories are then consumed in Africa. Africa
remains a large laboratory for testing of concepts and theories.
This explains why many African students continue to make great treks to
Europe and North America for education, even though the dream of ‘one coun -
try one university’ has long been realized by Africa. African scholars continue to 
seek affirm ation and validation of their knowledge in Europe and North America.
This affirm ation and validation take the form of publication in the so-called
international, high-impact and peer-reviewed journals. Europe and North America
constitute the ‘international’ and the rest of the world is ‘local’. Consequently,
international, high-impact and peer-reviewed journals, and internationally respected
publishing houses and presses are those located in Europe and North America.
Highly ranked universities are located in Europe and North America. Taken
together, these realities confirm the existence of epistemic hegemony. The signature
of epistemic hegemony is the idea of ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘knowledges’.
Contextualizing African struggles for epistemic freedom
Resurgent struggles for epistemic freedom are provoked by the reality of continued
entrapment of knowledge production in Africa within Euro-North American
colonial matrices of power. Since power and knowledge are inextricably inter -
twined, control of the domain of knowledge generation and knowledge cultivation
remain very important for the maintenance of asymmetrical global power structures
in place since the dawn of Euro-North American-centric modernity. This is why
Walter D. Mignolo (2007: 463) articulated epistemic decolonization as an expansive
movement targeting the ‘geo-political location of theology, secular philosophy
and scientific reason and simultaneously affirming the modes and principles of
knowledge that have been denied by the rhetoric of Christianisation, civilisation,
progress, development, market democracy’.
The broader discursive context of epistemic struggles is what became known
as ‘modernity’. Gurminder K. Bhambra (2007: 1) correctly noted that ‘Modernity
is the dominant frame for social and political thought, not just in the West, but
across the world’. She went further to explain two key assumptions that
underpinned modernity ‘rupture and difference – a temporal rupture that distinguishes
a traditional, agrarian past from the modern, industrial present; and a fundamental
difference that distinguishes Europe from the rest of the world’ (Bhambra 2007:
1). Bhambra’s intellectual intervention is very important because it challenges ‘the
continued privileging of the West as the “maker” of universal history and seek to
develop alternatives from which to begin to deal with the questions that arise once
we reject this categorization’ (Bhambra 2007: 2).
If anything called ‘universal history’ exists in the first place, it can only do so
as a sum total of diverse human histories. Seeking to move beyond the trap of
what Immanuel Wallerstein (1997) termed ‘anti-Eurocentric-Eurocentrism’,
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Bhambra contested the very idea of Europe, particularly the ‘facts’ of ‘specialness
of Europe’ in human history (Bhambra 2007: 2–3). She defined Eurocentrism
(that leitmotif of modernity) as nothing other than ‘the belief, implicit or otherwise,
in the world historical significance of events believed to have developed
endogenously within the cultural-geographical sphere of Europe’ (Bhambra
2007:  5). The second important intervention of Bhambra is:
The ideas of difference and rapture that form debates about modernity
should be regarded as ‘interpretative categories’, whereby the ‘unity’ and
‘integrity’ of specific experiences are created by abstraction from wider
interconnection.
(Bhambra 2007: 7)
Bhambra (2007: 10) proceeded to pose an important epistemological argument:
‘The historicity of the human condition, whereby we are born into pre-existing
conversations regarding our pasts and our presents, necessarily shapes the positions
from where we think and argue.’ To Bhambra, the colonial encounter, which was
far from being ‘an encounter and more a conquest, domination, and enslavement
of peoples and forms of life [. . .] is constitutive of the very disciplines that express
or seek to understand modernity’ (Bhambra 2007: 16). She proposed: ‘What is
required is a more thoroughgoing analysis of the underlying assumptions upon
which discourses and practices come to be premised’ (Bhambra 2007: 21).
Building on the work of Sanjay Subrahmanyam (1997, 2005), Bhambra
concluded that the escape route from the trap of a Euromodernity is to project
‘connected histories’ as a departure point because such an approach ‘allows the
deconstruction of dominant narratives at the same time as they are open to
different perspectives and seek to reconcile them systematically both in terms of
reconstruction of theoretical categories and in the incorporation of new data and
evidence’ (Bhambra 2007: 33). Cascading from this analysis, one key aspect of
decolonial epistemic struggles of the twenty-first century is to correct the distorted
human relationships that emerged from the social classification of human species
and their racial hierarchization. This ‘reinvention’ of the human by other humans
has had long-term implications for knowledge, education and social theory.
Also, what emerged clearly from this engagement with the ubiquitous modernity
is that to gain a deeper understanding of the essence of the struggles for epistemic
freedom, it is important to appreciate the entanglement of knowledge in
imperial/colonial economy and politics. A clear understanding of entwinement of
knowledge in both economic and epistemic extraversion is very important. The
work of Samir Amin (1968) introduced the concept of ‘extraversion’ from a
political economy perspective. Extraversion is to turn a previously functioning,
stable and alive economy upside down so as to lose its self-sustaining stamina
through destabilization of its internal coherence (Amin 1974). It goes further to
entail subordinating such an economy to the whims and needs of global capital
and minority bourgeois ruling classes (Amin 1973). The result is what became
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known as ‘underdevelopment’, which arose during the forcible integration of
African subsistence economies into the global capitalist market through such
devices as enslavement and colonization (Amin 1990). Hountondji (1996) extended
the concept of economic extraversion and applied it to the domain of knowledge
and coined ‘intellectual extraversion’. He explained that:
I found an approach that situated the production of knowledge in the
general context of production tout court and that examined North/South
relations in the field of science and technology on this basis illuminating and
heuristically fruitful.
(Hountondji 2002: 255)
Just as economic extraversion resulted in economic dependence, intellectual
extraversion resulted in scientific dependence. Both situations provoked struggles
for ‘delinking’. Just as economic dependence produced a situation of ‘growth
without development’, scientific dependence produced knowledge without
invention. Intellectual extraversion is indeed an ‘analysis of the scientific and
technological relations of production on an international scale; and a critique of
the actual functioning of research in the periphery as it relates to the world 
of knowledge controlled and managed by the rich countries of the North’
(Hountondji 2002: 161). Hountondji went on to explain the process of epistemic
freedom in these useful words:
To learn anew to be free intellectually and politically, that to me was the
current requirement. This liberty presupposes the reassessment of the status
that had been worked out, the paradigms that had been established, and the
canons of thought that had been developed for us. Shutting ourselves up 
in our cultural past – a purely apologetic relation to our heritage – would
respond exactly to what is expected of us. In this regard, nothing will be
more Euro-centred than a febrile nationalism that would be content to hold
up the treasures of African culture to the face of the world by congealing
them, mummifying them, freezing them in their muggy eternity.
(Hountondji 2002: 190)
Here, Hountondji is offering both pathways to be pursued in search of epistemic
freedom and is also warning us about the dangers of degenerating into nativism in
our struggles for epistemic freedom.
Having framed the context of the struggles for epistemic freedom, it is important
to understand the trajectories of this struggle since it has a long history. The history
of knowledge generation and knowledge cultivation in Africa began with what
Falola termed the ‘traditional intellectuals/traditional elites’ that comprised priests,
kings, chiefs, magicians, praise poets and merchants of the pre-colonial era (Falola
2001: 56). These people produced mainly oral knowledge that drove pre-colonial
African societies. The advent of colonialism became very brutal to these African
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knowers. Kings were attacked, defeated, captured and decapitated. The decapitated
heads of African kings were taken and transported overseas to decorate European
museums. Some were buried with their head-up-side-down as a symbolic act of
signifying the death of the African world. Yet others were exiled to very cold
islands as part of dismembering them from their societies.
Ngugi wa Thiong’o (2009a) argued convincingly that ‘dismemberment’ was
part of colonial technology of planting European memory. He gave the example
of Waiyaki wa Hinga who actively led his Gikuyu people against British
colonialism. He was eventually captured and removed from the centre of his
people only to be ‘buried alive’ at ‘Kibwezi, head facing the bowels of the earth
– in opposition to the Gikuyu burial rites’ requirements that the body face Mount
Kenya, the dwelling place of the Supreme Deity’ (Ngugi wa Thiong’o 2009a: 3).
Informed by Cartesian philosophy, European colonialists targeted heads of African
kings because to them the heads carried knowledge and memory. They had to be
cut from the bodies as part of the broader process of dismemberment. The
knowledgeable African women were simply discredited as witches. Remember
that in Indo-Europe itself knowledgeable women had been burned alive accused
of being witches during a period that Ramon Grosfoguel has correctly termed ‘the
four genocides/epistemicides of the long 16th century’ (see Grosfoguel 2013:
73–90).
Those who survived death together with magicians were discredited as demon
possessed and subjected to forcible and violent conversion to Christianity.
Conversion was itself a form of epistemicide. Achille Mbembe (2015: 213–214)
distilled five features Christianity as a monotheistic system with God as its apex
symbolizing ‘fantasm of the One’. The first feature is primacy (god who signified
only himself and is the genesis). The second is totalization (condensation of
sovereignty that is against plurality of gods). The third is monopoly (suppression 
of other forms of worship/incompatibility with worship of other gods). The
fourth is omnipotence (divinity and its supreme essentiality). The fifth is the ultimate
(alpha and omega) (see Mbembe 2015: 214–215). Mbembe defined the epistemic
implications of ‘conversion’ in these informative words:
[T]he act of conversion is also involved in the destruction of worlds. To
convert the other is to incite him or her to give up what she or he believed.
Theoretically, the passage from one belief system to another ought to entail
the submission of the convert to the institution and authority in charge of
proclaiming the new belief. In actuality, every conversion has always been,
if only covertly, an operation of selection has always required, on the part
of the convert, an exercise of judgement. Further, it is also assumed that the
person who is converted agrees to accept, in everyday life, the practical
consequences of this submission and of this transfer of allegiance. [. . .] By
divesting himself or herself of previous beliefs, the neophyte is supposed to
have shifted his or her centre of gravity. A test or ordeal of defamiliarization
and disorientation, conversion distances the convert from family, relatives,
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language, customs, even from geographical environment and social contacts
– that is, from various forms of inscription in a genealogy and an imaginary.
(Mbembe 2015: 228–229)
Mbembe elaborated on the essence and meaning of ‘conversion’ that:
Therefore, from a theological point of view, conversion is supposed to
move from death to life – or, in any event, to the promise of life. This tend
to suggest that conversion always involves an act of destruction and violence
against an earlier state of affairs, an accustomed state for which one seeks to
substitute something different. This act of violence and destruction is always
carried out in the name of a specific materiality, one that claims to oppose
a system of truth to an order of error and falsehood.
(Mbembe 2015: 229–230)
Fundamentally, according to Mbembe (2015: 231), ‘conversion always
presupposes an entry into the time of the other’. Conversion is a mechanism of
epistemicide. On the graveyard of African indigenous knowledges, colonialism
planted European memory. The church and the school played a major role in the
planting of European memory including imposition of colonial languages. What
is often ignored in the analysis of the impact of missionary education on Africa is
that by the time the colonialists were conquering and colonizing Africa in the
nineteenth century, already Europe, where they came from, was distancing itself
from theological thought. It has been undergoing intensive secularization since the
dawn of Enlightenment. For them to then come to Africa and introduce ‘education
for salvation’ was part of the broader colonial process of desocializing African
people out of their cultural and historical context into zombies of colonialism.
Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986: 16) emphasized that ‘the most important area of
domination was the mental universe of the colonized, the control through culture,
of how people perceived themselves and their relationship to the world’. The
missionary church and the colonial school were meant to establish effective mental
control. Ali A. Mazrui (1978) documented how the establishment of mission
boarding schools was meant to separate African children from the influence of
their parents and the home environment and how this process eventually influenced
a new class formation in Africa. The French colonizers became famous for their
‘cultural arrogance’ whereas the British became well known for their ‘racial
arrogance’ and all these ‘arrogances’ combined to degrade the very humanity and
cultures of Africa (Mazrui 1978: 11).
Christianization constituted a form of education and an epistemicide
simultaneously. It is not surprising that the earliest group of educated Africans
consisted of Christianized ex-slaves. At the time of abolition of slavery some of
these educated Christianized ex-slaves were shipped back to Africa and they
founded Sierra Leone and Liberia as independent republics within a colonized
continent. These early Africans had imbibed Western thought and experienced
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Western lifestyles from the traumatic experiences of bondage, colonial schools,
mission schools and churches ( July 1968). Their activism and struggles were
limited to what Mazrui (1978: 12) termed ‘rebellious emulation’. They had not
yet developed decolonial or anti-colonial consciousness necessary for tearing away
from colonialism and Christian missionary thought. Mazrui (1978: 16) correctly
noted that the influence of Western education became that of ‘psychological
deruralization’ to the extent that the educated African ‘became in a fundamental
sense a misfit in his own village’. Dramatizing the negative influence of colonial
education on Africans, Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986: 9) argued that:
Berlin conference of 1884 was effected through the sword and the bullet.
But the night of the sword and the bullet was followed by the morning of
the chalk and the blackboard. The physical violence of the battlefield was
followed by the psychological violence of the classroom.
It is not surprising that the early African educated elite, which comprised of
evangelists, bishops, reverends, nurses and teachers, were deeply seduced by the
salvationist and civilizationist promises of colonial education and that being fluent
in colonial languages such as French and English was part of acquisition of
knowledge itself. Mazrui (1978) provided a catalogue of the benefits of gaining
colonial education within a fast-changing colonial environment where anything
African had to die unless it was of benefit to the project of colonialism. The most
poignant change and benefit took place at the centre of new class formation. This
is how Mazrui (1987: xiii) put it:
The colonial impact transformed the natural basis of stratification in Africa.
Instead of status based on, say age, there emerged status based on literacy.
Instead of classes emerging from the question ‘who owns what?’, class
formation now responded to the question ‘who knows what?’
The seeds of scientific and intellectual dependency are rooted in the seductive
nature of colonial education as well as the epistemicides, linguicides and alienations
it committed. As correctly stated by Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986: 11): ‘The language
of my education was no longer the language of my culture.’ The long-term
consequence of colonial education has been the distortion of African consciousness
as colonial education was deliberately meant to ‘obscure reality and force a certain
perception of reality’ consonant with the colonial project (Ngugi wa Thiong’o
2012: 30). Frantz Fanon captured the epistemicidal nature of colonialism very well
when he wrote:
Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and
emptying the brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverse logic, it
turns to the past of oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it.
(Fanon 1968: 210)
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The key consequence of this process is alienation. Ngugi wa Thiong’o captured
the essence of alienation in these revealing words:
The colonial process dislocates the traveller’s mind from the place he or 
she already knows to a foreign land. It is a process of continuous alienation
from the base, a continuous process of looking at oneself from the outside
of self or with the lenses of a stranger. One may end up identifying with 
the foreign base as the starting point, from self to other selves. [. . .] This
colonization of the cognitive process was the everyday experience in a
colonial classroom anywhere.
(Ngugi wa Thiong’o 2012: 39)
Emerging from this alienating terrain, modern African intellectualism has never
been a simple one of enjoyment and a mere professional vocation. The activist
aspect is embedded through and through. It has taken the formats of empiricism,
ideological interventions and activism simultaneously. What is disturbing, though,
is that despite the fact that African intellectuals have produced numerous books
and journal articles speaking directly on pertinent issues of epistemic freedom and
development, these works have not succeeded in replacing those of Western
theorists such as Michael Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, Max Weber and Karl Marx,
even within African academies. African intellectual productions have not yet
assumed dominance in the field of global knowledge in the way that Marx,
Derrida and Foucault are doing currently. The African academy has remained a
site of inculcation of Western knowledge, values, ways of knowing and worldviews
that are often taught as universal values and scientific knowledge. The African
continent is still stuck with the problem of ‘the place that Western thought
occupies in non-Western discursive formations’ (Diawara 1990: 56).
Thandika Mkandawire (1995: 2) sought to understand and explain the ideo -
logical orientation of African intellectuals and logic behind their emphasis on
different issues affecting Africa and he developed the notion of ‘three generations’
of African intellectuals. The first generation of African intellectuals were the first
to occupy academic positions in the universities at the time of attainment of
political independence. Many of them became ardent supporters of African
nationalism and uncritical celebrators of political independence. The second
generation of African intellectuals comprised African scholars that were produced
during the hey-day of the Marxist and neo-Marxist schools of thought, and some
of them were products of African universities themselves.
What was distinctive about this group was their faithful adherence to Marxist
and political economy thought. They supported African nationalism and were
anti-imperialist. They were at the same time critical of the neo-colonial direction
that the postcolonial state was taking. The third generation of scholars became the
current young academics, most of whom were produced by African universities
as well as non-African institutions and have imbibed neoliberal, postcolonial and
postmodernist thought. Most of them became critical of African nationalism,
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particularly its antipathy towards democracy and its disdain for human rights. But
the categorization of African intellectuals into three generations is not cast in
stone, as ideological persuasions and intellectual traditions ‘criss-crossed’ the
generations easily and tendentiously.
There are also common experiences that characterized African intellectual
interventions across the three generations. For instance, Peter N. Thuynsma
explained why issues such as socialism and development have pre-occupied the
African mind and African struggles for freedom. He stated:
Africanists have never been able to afford scholarship for its luxury. In
whatever field, we have worked with an unwritten command to tell our
people about our people. We have had to work our way out from under a
number of historical boulders rolled over us by foreign interests (emphasis
in the original source).
(Thuynsma 1998: 45)
No wonder that African intellectual interventions have often sounded deeply
polemical, if not aggressive. Falola explained why:
Reading the works of Africans or listening to their lectures, you may form
an impression that they are polemical or defensive, bitter or apologetic. Yes,
you are right! However, you need to know the reason for this. Scholarship
in Africa has been conditioned to respond to a reality and epistemology
created for it by outsiders, a confrontation with imperialism, the power of
capitalism, and the knowledge that others have constructed for Africa. The
African intelligentsia does not write in a vacuum but in a world saturated
with others’ statements, usually negative about its members and their
continent. Even when this intelligentsia seeks the means to intrude itself into
the modern world, modernity has been defined for it and presented to it in
a fragmented manner.
(Falola 2001: 17)
Even though African people have continued to be major consumers of ideas
generated in the West and tested on the African soil and on African minds, some
African scholars began to engage and critique Western epistemology from an
Afrocentric perspective. For instance, Archie Mafeje had this to say:
Afrocentrism is nothing more than a legitimate demand that African scholars
study their society from inside and cease to be purveyors of an alienated
intellectual discourse [. . .] [W]hen Africans speak for themselves and about
themselves, the world will hear the authentic voice, and will be forced to
come to terms with it in the long-run [. . .] If we are adequately Afrocentric
the international implications will not be lost on others.
(Mafeje 2000: 66)
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Claude Ake added his voice to the debate on the decolonization knowledge
when he argued:
Every prognostication indicates that Western social science continues to play
a major role in keeping us subordinate and underdeveloped; it continues to
inhibit our understanding of the problems of our world, to feed us noxious
values and false hopes, to make us pursue policies which undermine our
competitive strength and guarantee our permanent underdevelopment 
and dependence. It is becoming increasingly clear that we cannot overcome
our underdevelopment and dependence unless we try to understand the
imperialist character of Western social science and to exorcise the attitudes
of mind which it inculcates.
(Ake 1979: 12)
At the centre of the African search for self-knowing are six core concerns and
demands: complete African self-rule, self-regeneration, self-understanding, self-
definition, self-knowing and self-articulation of African issues after centuries of
domination and silencing. While Achille Mbembe (2002) tried to caricature these
legitimate African concerns as nativism and Afro-radicalism, these aspirations form a
core part of the quest for freedom, development and identity in a world still dominated
by Western particularistic world views that have been universalized and globalized.
Black scholars from the Diaspora like Molefi Asante (1988) have questioned
and critiqued Eurocentrism even more consistently than those African intellectuals
based on the continent. Asante is well known for his consistent and systematic
push for ‘Afrocentricity’ not only as a direct challenge to Eurocentricity but as
another epistemology that takes Africa as it departure point. Afrocentricity is ‘the
belief in the centrality of Africans in post-modern history’ and a ‘critical perspective
placing African ideals at the centre of any analysis that involves African culture or
behaviour’ (Asante 1987).
Within the continent such scholars as Dani W. Nabudere have also been very
vocal on issues of epistemological decolonization. Nabudere’s Afrikology, Philosophy
and Wholeness: An Epistemology (2011) boldly and directly confronted the limits of
Eurocentrism and traced the historiography of African epistemology from the
‘Cradle of Humanity’, which is Africa. Nabudere emphasized that all sources of
knowledge were valid within their historical, cultural and social contexts. He used
the term ‘Afrikology’ to refer to an Africa-focused epistemology that fully took
into account African history, culture and context. Nabudere argued:
The construction of the science of Afrikology therefore directly flows from
the need for Africans to redefine their world, which can enable them to
advance their self-understanding and the world around them based on their
cosmologies. [. . .]. Afrikology must proceed from the proposition that [it]
is a true philosophy of knowledge and wisdom based on African cosmologies
because it is Afri- in that it is inspired by ideas originally produced from the
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Cradle of Humankind located in Africa. It is not Afrikology because it is African
but it is Afri- because it emanates from the source of the Universal system
of knowledge in Africa.
(Nabudere 2011: 17–18)
But why is it difficult to break from the colonizer’s model of the world and the
epistemology it produced? Ashis Nandy’s book The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery
of Self under Colonialism (1983) provided part of the answer. His concept of an
‘intimate enemy’ speaks to colonialism as that enemy that invades and resides in
one’s heart, mind and body. Intimate enemies consistently survive through processes
of naturalizing and routinizing themselves as part of camouflaging so as to claim
non-existence. Nandy vividly described how colonialism existed and oper ated as an
‘intimate enemy’ that worked on the psychology of both colonized and colonizing
societies. The concept of ‘intimate enemy’ captured accurately the reality of
colonialism’s ‘colonization of the minds in addition to bodies and it releases forces
within the colonized societies to alter their cultural priorities once for all’ resulting
in internalization of Eurocentrism (‘The West is now everywhere, within the West
and outside; in structures and minds’) (Nandy 1983: xi). For Nandy:
[T]he drive over men is not merely a by-product of a faulty political
economy but also of a world view which believes in the absolute superiority
of the human over the nonhuman and the subhuman, the masculine over the
feminine, the adult over the child, the historical over the ahistorical, and the
modern or progressive over the traditional or the savage. It has become more
and more apparent that genocides, ecodisasters and ethnocides are but the
underside of corrupt sciences and psychopathic technologies wedded to new
secular hierarchies, which have reduced major civilizations to the status of a
set of empty rituals. The ancient forces of human greed and violence, one
recognises, have merely found a new legitimacy in anthropocentric doctrines
of secular salvation, in the ideologies of progress, normality and hyper-
masculinity, and in theories of cumulative growth of science and technology.
(Nandy 1983: x)
Nandy also highlighted how deceitful colonialism is as an ‘intimate enemy’. It
presents itself as bringing about civilization, progress and development as it subverts
and destroys the order it found. Thus the colonialism that is invoked in Nandy’s
(1983: xi) work is one ‘which survives the demise of empires’. As a strategy of
defeating colonialism, Nandy (1983: 3) posits: ‘Perhaps that which begins in the
minds of men must also end in the minds of men’. This is because ‘colonialism is
first of all a matter of consciousness and needs to be defeated ultimately in the
minds of men’ (Nandy 1983: 63). This is why this book is focused on epistemic
freedom that speaks directly to both technologies of dismemberment and the
struggles for what Nandy (1983) termed ‘recovery of self under colonialism’.
Nandy’s analysis resonates with that of Ngugi wa Thiong’o, which emphasizes the
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process of decolonization of the mind as the first article of freedom and documents
various African and Africa Diasporic initiatives aimed at ‘recovery of self under
colonialism’ in order to ‘re-member’ Africa after centuries of ‘dismemberment’
(Ngugi wa Thiong’o 2009a, 2009b).
Silences as epistemicides
A struggle for epistemic freedom is ranged against silences as an imperial/colonial
technology of dismemberment. The first silence cascaded from the very Eurocentric
idea of history and the philosophy of history. The epistemic problem that emerged
out of this development was termed ‘historicism’ by Chakrabarty (2007). The
problem of ‘historicism’ defied even Marxist critique of bourgeois society and
capital, and was in fact reproduced by Marx through his stagist conceptions of
human history. The problem of historicism is fundamentally that of Cartesian and
Enlightenment reason as they spoke to what is knowledge and transcendence over
the so-called irrationalities and superstitions. Here was born the Eurocentric idea
of history ‘as the rational-secular discipline’ (Chakrabarty 2007: 237). At the centre
of this idea of history was the ‘spirit of science’, ‘rational outlook’, ‘free enquiry’
and faith in ‘progress’ (Chakrabarty 2007: 237).
From the ideas of ‘rapture’ and ‘difference’ as constitutive technologies of
colonization of time emerged the problematic paradigm of difference as well as
the monolingual language of social science that obliterated the realities of plural
ways of being human and knowing. At the centre of ‘historicism’ is the story of
Europe as a ‘macrohistory’ of the human. Furthermore, this was the basis for
‘irrational’ rationality within history as a knowledge system. This ‘irrationality’
manifested itself through overrepresentation of Europe if not outright dominance
in historical knowledge. The long-standing consequence of historicism was to
sub ordinate and subsume all human histories within the Western episteme and 
to reduce all diverse histories into mere episodes within an assumed ‘universal
transcendental history with a capital ‘H’. This is why Allen (2016: 25), building
on the work of Latin American decolonial theorists, called ‘for the specific project
of rethinking the relationship between history and normativity that is necessary if
critical theory is to be decolonized’. She concluded:
[C]ritical theory stands in need of decolonization insofar as its strategy for
grounding normativity relies on the notion of historical progress; thus, if
critical theory is to be decolonized, it will have to find another strategy for
grounding normativity and another way of thinking about progress.
(Allen 2016: 36)
Historicism as an epistemicide affected the rest of the colonized part of the
world. The Caribbean scholar Edouard Glissant has systematically critiqued the
Eurocentric idea of history and philosophy of history from the vantage point of
the Caribbean black societies:
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History is a highly functional fantasy of the West, originating at precisely
the time when it alone ‘made’ the history of the world. If Hegel relegated
African people to the ahistorical, Amerindians peoples to the prehistorical,
in order to reserve History for European peoples exclusively, it appears that
it is not because these African or American peoples ‘have entered History’
that we can conclude today that such a hierarchical conception of the
‘march of history’ is no longer relevant.
(Glissant 1999: 61)
Because of the impact of the slave trade and the experience of the ‘middle
passage’, the Caribbean terribly suffers from what Glissant (1999: 63) has termed
‘nonhistory’. Like all other victims of the epistemicide known as ‘historicism’,
Glissant (1999) consistently worked to undermine and unmask the notion of a
coherent, progressive and linear history (‘from the shame of Fallenness to the glory
of cosmic Perfection’) (see Introduction by Dash 1999: xxviii). The Caribbean just
like Africa fell on the margins of such a conception of history. To Glissant the
totalizing imperative of ‘a transcendental History (with a capital H)’ resulted in 
the reproduction of a Hegelian ‘division of History into ahistory, prehistory and
History’ (see Introduction by Dash 1999: xxix). This Eurocentric rendition of
history into a singular ‘macrohistory’ had had a deadly effect on Africa, Latin
America, the Caribbean and Asia.
With specific reference to Africa, it was actually Terence Osborne Ranger, the
British liberal Africanist historian, who posed the question of how ‘African’ is
‘African history’ as he reflected on methodology and methods as well as thematic
concerns cascading from Western historiography and their sufficiency as tools for
researching and narrating African history’ (see Ranger 1968, Atieno-Odhiambo
2002). He posited that there was need
to examine whether African history was sufficiently Africa; whether it had
developed the methods and models appropriate to its needs or had depended
upon making use of methods and models developed elsewhere; whether its
main themes of discourse had arisen out of the dynamics of African
development or had been imposed because of their over-riding significance
in the historiography of other continents.
(Ranger 1968: x)
The debate was picked up by the Kenyan historian Bethwell Allan Ogot in the
1970s and he called for a development of ‘philosophy of history of Africa’ (Ogot
1978: 33). He elaborated:
We have struggled hard to reject a conceptual framework which is Western
both in its origins as well as its orientations. But we have not yet succeeded
in evolving an autonomous body of theoretical thinking. Herein lies the
root of our cultural dependence.
(Ogot 1978: 33)
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The challenge of silences in African history in particular and African Studies in
general has also been at the centre of the work of the Congolese historian Jacques
Depelchin in recent years. In his book entitled Silences in African History: Between
the Syndromes of Discovery and Abolition (2005: xi), Depelchin highlighted what he
described as ‘the Herculean task of producing historical knowledges for a group
of people who were seen by the hegemonic other as lacking history/sense of
history’. Understood from the perspective of silences, the epistemic struggle is a
direct confrontation with the Columbian-Hegelian-Conradian-Hugh Trevor
Ropian imperial/colonial discourse, not of simple silencing but exclusion.
To deeply appreciate the importance of the struggle for epistemic freedom, it
is important to understand the discursive terrain of politics of knowledge,
particularly such key elements as ‘subject-positions, institutional practices, systems
of exclusion, epistemes, and so forth’ (Allen 2016: 213). Political decolonization
of the twentieth century did not delve deeper into the complexities of the know -
ledge terrain, hence it failed to deliver epistemological decolonization (Depelchin
2005: xii). For those people who endured enslavement, colonialism, capitalist
exploitation, cultural imperialism, forced religious conversion, gender and race
discrimination as well as political domination and repression, silences constitute
facts of their lives (Depelchin 2005). Depelchin’s analysis confronted epistemic
violence in its various guises and manifestations including those embedded in
research techniques and methodologies as well as in ‘syndromes of discovery and
abolition’. Depelchin had this to say:
The syndrome of abolition can be clearly seen in the words and actions of
the ‘abolitionists’ who fought to end slavery, crediting themselves as the
ones to realise its inhumanity; as if those oppressed by slavery had not
already been aware of this.
(Depelchin 2005: 6)
Broadly speaking, according to Depelchin (2005: 12), African history has
undergone two forms of silencing: ‘denial’ of existence right up to the 1960s and
‘recognition’ since then. Depelchin posited:
In reality, however, it was the former which continued to dominate, but
under a different form. The apparent paradigmatic shift – from denial to
recognition – can be revealed as false by showing that the affirmation was
paralleled by a systematic silencing of questions, themes and/or conceptual -
izations. So, in reality, what took place was a redefinition or reformulation
of denial.
(Depelchin 2005: 12)
Depelchin also confronted the dominant narrative of ‘discovery’ that dominated
in the story of the unfolding of modernity, imperialism and colonialism. He
argued that ‘Nothing is “discovered” until such “discovery” can become part of
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the arsenal of the reproduction of the superiority of the discoverers’ (Depelchin
2005: 13).
The theme of silencing of the past is also the subject of the Michael-Rolph
Trouillot’s classic book Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History (1995)
in which he distilled and delineated four major moments of silencing of history in
general:
Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments:
the moment of fact creation (the making of sources); the moment of fact
assembly (the making of archives); the moment of fact retrieval (the making
of narratives); and the moment of retrospective significance (the making of
history in the final instance).
(Trouillot 1995: 26)
Trouillot underscored these four moments of silencing the past as he grappled
with the silenced significance of Haitian Revolution of 1791–1804 that is always
overshadowed by the histories of French and American Revolutions. The
importance of the Haitian Revolution for Africa in particular and humanity in
general is that it confronted racism, slavery and colonialism very early in the annals
of modern global history. Fundamentally, the Haitian Revolution was a heroic
struggle organized and prosecuted by black people whose humanity was denied
and who were reduced to commodities and enslaved, and inferiorized as slaves.
To Trouillot (1995: 82) the Haitian Revolution was subjected to a major silence
known as the ‘unthinkable’ (‘that for which one has no adequate instruments to
conceptualize’). He elaborated on this point this way:
The Haitian Revolution did challenge the ontological and political
assumptions of the most radical writers of the Enlightenment. The events
that shook up Saint Dominique from 1791to 1804 constituted a sequence
for which not even the extreme political left in France or in England had a
conceptual frame of reference. They were ‘unthinkable’ facts in the
framework of western thought. [. . .] The unthinkable is that which one
cannot conceive within the range of possible alternatives, that which perverts
all answers because it defies the terms under which the questions were
phrased. In that sense, the Haitian Revolution was unthinkable in its time:
it challenged the very framework within which proponents and opponents
had examined race, colonialism, and slavery in the Americas.
(Trouillot 1995: 82–83)
The Haitian Revolution signified a radical paradigmatic shift in the very
conceptions of the human and in other ways. It directly challenged the colonial
discourse of doubting the humanity of those people they reduced to slaves that
made slave-owners to propagate a false view of obedient ‘Negros’ who do not
think and for whom revolt was impossible. The reality of the Haitian Revolution
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spearheaded by the enslaved did not coincide with deeply held Eurocentric colonial
and racist discourses of an enslaved people who could not imagine freedom. The
Haitian Revolution broke the philosophical, epistemological and ontological
Western ethno-beliefs.
Trouillot (1995: 88) correctly designated the Haitian Revolution as that
moment, which is located ‘at the limits of the thinkable’. Not only the slave-
owners but even the philosophers of Europe could not think of black enslaved
people organizing themselves and establishing solidarity that was capable of pro -
ducing a coordinated and successful revolution. Hence, attempts were made to
blame outsiders/non-existent agitators as the brains behind the revolution. Even
the victory of the black slave is trivialized through emphasis on how the diseases
not the actions of the black enslaved people made the revolution successful (‘The
Haitian Revolution appears obliquely as part of medical history’) (Trouillot 1995:
99). Black racial pride and black agency was unthinkable.
The Haitian Revolution is relevant for any history of black people not only
because it led to the collapse of a system of slave trade but because it produced the
first independent black-ruled republic of Haiti. It challenged most of what Europeans
had told themselves and believed in. Trouillot (1995: 107) concluded: ‘The silencing
of the Haitian Revolution is only a chapter within a narrative of global domination.’
The major lesson is that the silencing of the Haitian Revolution was reproduced on
a world scale and it was sustained by genocides, epistemicides, linguicides as well as
outright ‘theft of history’ to use Jack Goody’s (2006) terminology.
Silences also arise from what Amy Allen (2016) has termed the ‘normative
foundation of critical theory’. Focused on how the Frankfurt School, which
despite its claims to be critical, was silent on racism, slavery, imperialism and
colonialism, Allen set out to explain the sources of this ‘quietude’. In fact, Allen
is building on the work of Edward E. Said who 1993 criticized the Frankfurt
School in these piercing words:
Frankfurt School critical theory, despite its seminal insights into the
relationships between domination, modern society, and the opportunities
for redemption through art as critique, is stunningly silent on racist theory,
anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire.
(Said 1993: 278)
Said posited that the ‘silence’ was never an oversight but ‘a motivated silence’
(Allen 2016: 1). It was a silence that emerged from ideas of ‘blithe universalism’,
which had normalized notions of racial inferiority of other people and routinized
subordination of other cultures to those of Europe. Allen (2016: 2) has noticed
that despite Said’s critique of 1993, the Frankfurt School ‘remains all too silent on
the problem of imperialism’. In search of explanation for this silence, Allen (2016)
ventured into the ‘normative foundations of critical theory’ as practiced by the
members of the Frankfurt School. Her discovery has been that there are core
Eurocentric normative beliefs on social evolution, historical progress, development
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and emancipation, which form the base of critical theory (Allen 2016: 3). This is
how she explained it:
Thus, they [members of Frankfurt School] are [. . .] deeply wedded to the
idea that European, Enlightenment modernity – or at least certain aspects or
features thereof, which remain to be spelled out – represent a developmental
advance over premodern, nonmodern, or traditional forms of life, and,
crucially, this idea plays an important role in grounding the normativity of
critical theory for each thinker. In other words, both Habermas and Honneth
are committed to the thought that critical theory needs to defend some idea
of historical progress in order to ground its distinctive approach to normativity
and, thus, in order to be truly critical. But it is precisely this commitment that
proves to be the biggest obstacle to the project of decolonizing their approaches to critical
theory.
(Allen 2016: 3, my emphasis)
The epistemic limits of the Frankfurt School and the blindness of its critical
theory to those key concerns affecting the ‘non-Western’ world, haunts the entire
Western thought and make the theorists fail to hear and comprehend the core
aspects of struggles for epistemic freedom cascading from the Global South.
Rethinking thinking
The epistemic and systemic crisis that is haunting the world today, calls for
rethinking thinking itself. Catherine Odora Hoppers and Howard Richards in
their Rethinking Thinking: Modernity’s ‘Other’ and the Transformation of the University
(2012: 8) articulated the essence of ‘rethinking thinking’ this way:
The casting of light at last onto subjugated peoples, knowledges, histories
and ways of living unsettles the toxic pond and transforms passive analysis
into a generative force that valorises and recreates life for those previously
museumised. [. . .] it is a process of engaging with colonialism in a manner
that produces a program for its dislocation. This dislocation is made possible
not only by permitting subalterns direct space for engaging with structures
and manifestations of colonialism, but also by inserting into discourse arena
totally different meanings and registers from other traditions. [. . .] The task
for rethinking thinking is therefore precisely this: to recognize the cultural
asphyxiation of those numerous ‘others’ that has been the norm, and work
to bring other categories of self definition, of dreaming, of acting, of loving,
of living into the commons as matter of universal concern.
Hoppers and Richards (2012) delved deeper into the constitutive make-up of
such disciplines as law, economics, education, and natural science in their endeavour
to rethink them. They posited:
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Law, like economics, science and education, is a box. These boxes consti -
tute four pillars of modernity. Law protects the propertied; science valorises
a mechanistic worldview over holistic cosmologies; economics upholds a
metaphysics that justifies survival of the fittest over the metaphysics of
sharing that governs a large majority of livelihoods in the world; education
refuses to recognize and build on the knowledge that the children from
non-western systems of thought have. Among the four boxes, circuits of
fragmentation and dehumanization are masked and rationalized.
(Hopper and Richards 2012: 45)
Building on this argument, Hoppers and Richards (2012: 50) emphasized the
need to change the rules that constitute the disciplines of law, education, science
and economics as part of setting afoot a new thinking in the knowledge domain.
Rethinking thinking, in their analysis, entailed rectification of the problem of
‘epistemological disenfranchisement’ (Hoppers and Richards 2012: 84). This is
necessary because knowledge constitutes the ‘software’ of coloniality.
Rethinking thinking is fundamentally a decolonial move that requires the
cultivation of a decolonial attitude in knowledge production. It is informed by a
strong conviction that all human beings are not only born into a know ledge
system but are legitimate knowers and producers of legitimate know ledge.
Rethinking thinking is also a painstaking decolonial process of ‘learning to un -
learn inorder to re-learn’ as well as an opening to other knowledges and thinkers
beyond those from Europe and North America that have dominated the academy
in the last 500 years (Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012). This ‘learning to unlearn’
entails the painstaking and difficult process of ‘forgetting what we have been
taught, to break free from the thinking programs imposed on us by education,
culture, and social environment, always marked by the Western imperial reason’
(Tlostanova and Mignolo 2012: 7).
Rethinking thinking also calls for what Lewis R. Gordon (2006) has rendered
as ‘shifting the geography of reason’. It is not only relevant for the Caribbean
world where the Caribbean Philosophical Association (CPA) has adopted it as a
motto. The imperative to shift the geography of reason arises from the reality of
dismemberment of black people from the human family, which raises the
fundamental problematic of ‘what it means to be human after the restrictions
placed on such a concept by modern conquest and colonization’ (Gordon 2006:
12). Shifting the geography of reason means a number of decolonial moves. In the
first place, it challenges the imperial/colonial historiographical tendency of making
European and North American historical experience the template of measuring
other historical experiences and that Europe and North America are the only
repositories of rational thinking. In the second place, it challenges the Hegelian
idea of an Africa that existed outside the geographical reach of reason. In the third
place, shifting the geography of reason challenges the old Cartesian view of
knowledge as an individual possession and restores the situatedness of knowledge
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in communities and civilizations (intersubjective character of knowledge) (Nisbett
2003: Banchetti-Robino and Headley 2006).
Rethinking thinking speaks to unthinking some of the presumptions of
knowledge that has been polluted by Eurocentrism so as to escape from what
Paulin Hountondji (1990) termed ‘scientific dependence’ and Syed Hussein Alatas
(1969; 1974) described as ‘the captive mind’. This rethinking thinking becomes
urgent not only in the context of liberating the colonized from Eurocentricism
and colonization of the minds but because of the exhaustion of what Immanuel
Wallerstein (1999: 4) terms ‘nineteenth century social science’. He elaborated:
It is quite normal for scholars and scientists to rethink issues. When important
new evidence undermines old theories and predictions do not hold, we are
pressed to rethink our premises. In that sense, much of nineteenth-century
social science, in the form of specific hypotheses, is constantly being
rethought. But, in addition to rethinking, which is ‘normal’, I believe we
need to ‘unthink’ nineteenth-century social science, because many of its
presumptions – which, in my view, are misleading and constrictive – still
have far too strong a hold on our mentalities. These presumptions, once
considered liberating of the spirit, serve today as the central intellectual
barrier to useful analysis of the social world.
(Wallerstein 1999: 4)
The situation becomes worse when African scholars are dependent on an
exhausted intellectual tradition and social science that is no longer useful in the
analysis of the social world in general and African experience in particular.
Hountondji (1990: 10) distilled 13 ‘indices of scientific dependence’. The first is
dependence on technical apparatuses made in Europe and North America. The
second is dependence on foreign libraries and documentation centres for up-to-
date scientific information. The third is what he termed ‘institutional nomadism,
a restless going to and fro’ European and North American universities. The fourth
dependence manifests itself as ‘brain drain’. The fifth is importation of theory from
the North to enlighten the data gathered in the South. The sixth dependence is
aversion to basic research and sticking to the colonial ideology of instrumentality
of knowledge. The seventh problem is in choice of research topics that is
determined by interests of the North where knowledge is validated (Hountondji
1990: 12).
The eighth dependence is confinement to territorial specializations in which
African scholars are often reduced to native informants. The ninth form of
dependence is that African scholars are engaged in scientific research that is of
direct service to coloniality. The tenth issue relates to research into indigenous
knowledge that eventually is disciplined to fit into the modes of Western science.
The eleventh challenge is that of linguistic dependence on six European languages
(English, French, German, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese) in teaching and
research. The twelfth index of scientific dependence is lack of communication
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among African scholars as most prefer ‘a vertical exchange and dialogue with
scientists from the North than horizontal exchange with fellow scholars from the
South’ (Hountondji 1990: 13). The final index of dependence manifests itself
through reproduction of mediocrity that makes it justifiable to look for competent
scholars in the North (Hountondji 1990: 13).
This analysis takes us to the consideration of the deeper intellectual and epis -
temo logical crisis. Issa G. Shivji clearly defined the African intellectual/epistemo -
logical crisis as manifested by the fact that:
The majority of African intellectuals have pretty well accommodated
mainstream thought. This includes former militant nationalists and radical
socialist intellectuals. The metamorphosis of the African intellectual from 
a revolutionary to an activist, from critical political economist to post -
modernist, from a social analyst to a constitutionalist liberal, from anti-
imperialist to a cultural atavist, from a radical economics professor to a
neo-liberal World Bank spokesperson, from an intellectual to a consultant
is blatant, unrepentant, and mercenary.
(Shivji 2003: 19)
Mamdani (2011: 5) clearly identified the African intellectual challenge for the
twenty-first century as that of questioning and unpacking the foundations of the
prevailing Euro-American intellectual paradigms which have turned the dominant
Western experience into a model under which research is conceived as nothing
other than a demonstration that non-Western societies around the world either
conform or deviate from that model. What is needed is to take the struggle for
decolonization to a higher level, informed by a decolonial epistemology focused
on unpacking the constitutive negative aspects of Western modernity as the
broader terrain within which coloniality and Euro-American epistemologies were
generated.
What is promising though in the domain of struggles for epistemic freedom is
that younger African scholars have not given up the liberatory agenda of rethinking
thinking and even unthinking some ideas introduced on Africa by colonialism and
hegemonic Eurocentric thinking. For example, the Nigerian decolonial feminist
sociologist Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997)’s work helps us to rethink thinking on
gender and the ‘woman question’. She took African society and context seriously
and eloquently demonstrated empirically and theoretically how Oyo history in
West Africa underwent three process of ‘patriarchalization’ through masculinization
of the alaafin, ‘feminization of certain positions, whereby the society-wide influence
of females in power has been narrowed to an undefined interest, distinct from the
rest of the community’, and ‘genderization’ through invention of an essentialized
category of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ that did not exist prior to colonialism in the Oyo-
Yoruba society of Nigeria. Oyewumi (1997)’s work is one of the best and
convincing testaments of how the very process of ‘writing history’ of Africa has
been informed by hegemonic Western thought and its analytical categories such
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as ‘biological determinism’, centrality of ‘bodies’ as well as privileging of sense of
sight (visual) over other sense to the extent of globalizing ideas of ‘worldview’
over ‘world sense’.
Oyewumi (1997)’s work directly confronted the silencing impact of imposition
of Western gender categories on Africa particularly the Yoruba of Nigeria. In
African studies, there is a general concern with how history writing has tended to
privilege ‘his story’ over and above ‘her story’ in capturing human experiences
across space and time. Oyewumi (1997) complicated this rather simplistic approach
of merely adding the experiences of women to a world of knowledge that wrongly
assumed the universality ‘gender’ and ‘woman’ categories as trans-cultural and
transhistorical. Oyewumi (1997: ix) posited ‘The woman question is a Western-
derived issue – a legacy of the age-old somatocentricity of Western thought. It is
an imported problem, and it is not indigenous to the Yoruba’. In Oyewumi’s
work one finds a robust, meticulously research and convincingly argued and first-
rate case of ‘rethinking thinking’ on gender in particular and African thought in
general. For instance, Oyewumi boldly revealed:
As the work and my thinking progressed, I came to realise that the
fundamental category ‘woman’ – which is foundational in Western gender
discourses – simply did not exist in Yorubaland prior to its sustained contact
with the West. There was no such pre-existing group characterised by
shared interests, desires, or social position. The cultural logic of Western
social categories is based on an ideology of biological determinism: the
conception that biology provides the rational for the organization of the
social world. Thus this cultural logic is actually a ‘bio-logic.’ Such categories
like ‘woman’ are based on body-type and are elaborated in relation to and
in opposition to another category: man; the presence or absence of certain
organs determines social position.
(Oyewumi 1997: ix–x)
The significance of Oyewumi’s work is that it intervened robustly on the
sociology of knowledge in general in the process directly challenging the dominant
Western thought while at many levels retrieving and anchoring African thought.
In the first place, Oyewumi (1997) challenges the idea of ‘gender’ as the first
article of faith in thinking about any society and its organization. She questioned
the Western idea of the universal subordination of women and even rejected the
universalization of the category ‘woman’ because in the Yoruba society ‘there
were no women – defined in strictly gendered terms – in that society’ (Oyewumi
1997: xi–xiii).
According to Oyewumi (1997) there is urgent need for careful historical and
sociological research on Africa that is not informed by existing analytical categories
borrowed from Europe and America. She identified some of the key problems of
history, theory and methodology that are themselves colonized. Oyewumi (1997:
x–xi) identified the core components of Western thought as privileging not only
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‘body-based categories’ but the sense of sight in its interpretation of human
phenomena. She elaborated on this problem this way:
In African studies, historically and currently, the creation, constitution, and
production of knowledge have remained the privilege of the West. There -
fore, body-reasoning and the bio-logic that derives from the biological
determinism inherent in Western thought have been imposed on African
societies. The presence of gender constructs cannot be separated from the
ideology of biological determinism. Western conceptual schemes and theories
have become so widespread that almost all scholarship, even by Africans,
utilizes them unquestioningly.
(Oyewumi 1997: x)
One of her points is that African scholars must be conscious of the fact that 
‘all concepts come with their own cultural and philosophical baggage, much of
which becomes alien distortion when applied to cultures other than those from
which they derive’ (Oyewumi 1997: xi). Oyewumi (1997: xi) posed the
fundamental question: ‘What are the relationships between, on the one hand, bio-
anatomical distinctions and gender differences as part of social reality and, on the
other hand, gender constructs as something that the observer brings to a particular
situation?’ Her response based on her meticulous sociological research on the
Yoruba society is:
The Yoruba case provides one such different scenario; and more than that,
it shows that the human body need not be constituted as gendered or be
seen as evidence for social classification at all times. In precolonial Yoruba
society, body-type was not the basis of social hierarchy: males and females
were not ranked according to anatomic distinction. The social order required
a different kind of map, not a gender map that assumed biology as the
foundation for social ranking.
(Oyewumi 1997: xii)
Oyewumi is not in any way creating the impression of a golden age of Yoruba
society that was a domain of pristine village democracies cascading from absence
of any form of hierarchization. She revealed:
Yoruba society was hierarchically organized, from slaves to rulers. The
ranking of individuals depended first and foremost on seniority, which was
usually defined by relative age. Another fundamental difference between
Yoruba and Western social categories involves the highly situational nature
of Yoruba social identity. In Yoruba society before the sustained infusion of
Western categories, social position of people shifted constantly in relation to
those with whom they were interacting; consequently, social identity was
relational and was not essentialized.
(Oyewumi 1996: xiii)
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Oyewumi launched a daring intellectual challenge to the existing feminist
discourses even revealing a fundamental contradiction in their understanding of
such concepts as gender (social construction) and sex (biological construction).
The contradiction if not feminist paradox is here: in the very celebrated ‘funda -
mental assumption of feminist theory is that women’s subordination is universal’
which universality of ‘gender asymmetry suggests a biological basis rather than a
cultural one, given that the human anatomy is universal whereas cultures speak in
myriad voices’ (Oyewumi 1997: 10). Oyewumi proceeded to unpack this paradox
in this manner:
That gender is socially constructed is said to mean that the criteria that make
up male and female categories vary in different cultures. If this is so, then it
challenges the notion that there is a biological imperative at work. From this
standpoint, then, gender categories are mutable, and as such, gender then is
denaturalized.
(Oyewumi 1997: 10)
Oyewumi’s point is very important for rethinking thinking on Africa because
it revealed how:
In fact, the categorization of women in feminist discourses as homogeneous,
bio-anatomically determined group which always constituted as powerless
and victimized does not reflect the fact that gender relations are social
relations and, therefore, historically grounded and culturally bound. If gender
is socially constructed, then gender cannot behave in the same manner
across time and space. If gender is a social construction, then we must
examine the various cultural/architectural sites where it was constructed,
and we must acknowledge that variously located actors (aggregates, groups,
interested parties) were part of construction. We must further acknowledge
that if gender is a social construction, then there was a specific time (in
different cultural/architectural sites) when it was ‘constructed’ and therefore
a time before which it was not. Thus, gender, being a social construction,
it is logical to assume that in some societies, gender construction need not
have existed at all.
(Oyewumi 1997: 10)
At another level, this generalization about powerless, disadvantaged and
victimized women across the world might be taken to be another form of silence
in which the world of the Yoruba society is ignored. But Oyewumi is careful not
to challenge one generalization while creating another based on one case study.
She is very clear on this:
Although it is clear that findings of this study are applicable to other African
societies, I hesitate to apply them broadly, primarily because I do not want
to fall into the common trap of erasing a multitude of African cultures by
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making facile generalizations, a process that results in unwarranted hom -
ogenization. The erasure of African cultures, a major defect of many studies
on Africa, motivates my efforts not to make a simplistic general case about
Africa from the Yoruba example.
(Oyewumi 1997: xiv)
What is important about Oyewumi’s work is that in her critique of Western-
centric ‘body-reasoning’ approaches to society that carried gender differentiation
as a major lens, she revealed how ‘scholars create gender categories’, how any
simplistic and uncritical deployment of gender lens ‘necessarily write gender into
that society’ under study and how ‘In actuality, the process of making gender
visible is also a process of creating gender’ (Oyewumi 1997: xv). Thus she
concluded her in these wise words:
The present book has cleared the way for asking first-order, foundational
questions about gender and difference in Yoruba society. It has shown that
our interest in gender in Yorubaland cannot be divorced from the West’s
domination of both the constitution of the academy/scholarship and the
socio-political and economic world spheres. Ultimately, this study raises the
question of whether it is possible to have independent research questions
and interests given the Western origins of most disciplines and continued
Western dominance of the world, for now.
(Oyewumi 1997: 179)
Rethinking thinking cannot be realized without decolonizing methodology
and research. It is here that the impressive work of Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999)
and Bagele Chilisa (2012) become indispensable. Smith and Chilisa’s work takes
us into the depth of the ‘sacred’ field of research and methodology and they
excavate the dirty colonial history embedded in the very activities of researching.
While Smith brought the world of the indigenous people of New Zealand into
the world of research, Chilisa brought the world of the indigenous people of
Africa into the world of research. It was Smith (1999) who bold declared that ‘re-
search’ was the most ‘dirtiest’ word because it involved enquiring into the secrets
and scared lives of those who were its objects.
Chilisa (2012: xv) departs from the questions of ‘social justice’ and ‘human
rights’ arising from the very research process. The convergence of Smith and
Chilisa’s work is on the call for decolonizing research methodologies as a process
towards achievement of epistemic freedom by those peoples such as women,
minorities, indigenous people, and formerly colonized, whose knowledges remain
marginalized. They both delved deeper into cultures, philosophies, histories and
power dynamics embedded in research and methodology.
Chilisa’s work highlighted how mainstream research conducted on those
societies considered being ‘non-Western’ still ignored other ways of knowing and
other knowledge systems. This means that the struggles of decolonizing and
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indigenizing research methodologies form an important part of the broader struggles
for epistemic freedom. Chilisa (2012: 3) argued:
Social science research needs to involve spirituality in research, respecting
communal forms of living that are non-Western and creating space for
inquiries based on relational realities and forms of knowing that are
predominant among non-Western Other/s still being colonized.
Chilisa formulated a useful definition of decolonization from the perspective of
research:
Decolonization is thus a process of conducting research in such a way that
the worldviews of those who have suffered a long history of oppression and
marginalization are given space to communicate from their frames of
reference. It is a process that involves ‘researching back’ to question how
the disciplines – psychology, education, history, anthropology, sociology, or
science – through an ideology of Othering have described and theorized
about the colonized Other, and refused to let the colonized Other name and
know their frame of reference.
(Chilisa 2012: 14)
Understood from a research and methodological perspective, decolonization
entails ‘deconstruction and reconstruction’, that is, ‘destroying what has wrongly
been written – for instance, interrogating distortions of people’s life experiences,
negative labelling, deficit theorizing, genetically deficient or culturally deficient
models that pathologizes the colonized Other – and retelling the stories of the past
and envisioning the future’ (see Smith 1999; Chilisa 2012: 17). At the centre of
this process is ‘recovery and discovery’ (Chilisa 2012: 17).
Decolonization is also about attainment of ‘self-determination and social justice’,
that is, seeking ‘legitimacy for methodologies embedded in histories, experiences,
ways of perceiving realities, and value systems’ on the one hand and on the other,
giving ‘voice to the researched and moves from deficient-based orientation’ to
‘reinforcing practices that have sustained the lives of the researched’ (Chilisa 2012:
17–18; see also Smith 1999). Chilisa’s work articulated what she termed ‘a
postcolonial indigenous research paradigm’ as ‘a framework of belief systems that
emanate from the lived experiences, values, and history of those belittled and
marginalised by Euro-Western research paradigms’ (Chilisa 2012: 19). To Chilisa
(2012: 20): ‘A postcolonial indigenous research is thus informed by relational
ontologies, relational epistemologies, and relational axiology.’
Organization of the book
The core chapters of the book are constructed around major African intellectual
and political thinkers. The emphasis is on how such intellectuals and political
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thinkers advanced the struggles of epistemic freedom. Featured in this book are
such African intellectuals and political thinkers as Cheikh Anta Diop, Edward
Wilmot Blyden, Frantz Fanon, Dani W. Nabudere, Cathrine Odora Hoppers,
Paulin J. Hountondji, Oyeronke Oyewumi, Bagele Chilisa, Jacques Depelchin,
Mahmood Mamdani, Achille Mbembe, Samir Amin, Francis Nyamnjoh, Thandika
Mkandawire, Issa Shivji, Peter Ekeh, Ali A. Mazrui, Leopold Sedar Senghor,
Kwame Nkrumah, Toyin Falola, Neville Alexander, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Jean
Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Yirga Gelaw Woldeyes, Amilcar Cabral, Kenneth
Kaunda and Nelson Mandela among many others. Some are dealt with in the
introductory chapter as they provide invaluable concepts usable in framing the
debates on epistemic freedom and others are included in the core chapters of 
the book.
The choice of African thinkers was not random. It was determined by the
relevance of their intellectual and political thought and interventions to the core
themes of the book. The core themes of the book range from epistemic freedom,
epistemological decolonization, decolonizing the university, Africanity, cognitive
justice, national question, meaning of freedom, decolonial pedagogy to African
futures. Therefore, such African thinkers as Edward Wilmot Blyden, who was
among the first people to fight for ‘an African university’, could not be ignored
in a book dealing with struggles for epistemic freedom. Mamdani’s work which
emphasized the historical legitimacy of Africa as a unit of analysis and revolted
against writing African history by analogy is very important in understanding issues
of epistemic freedom. Because epistemic and ontological questions are inextricably
intertwined, the expansive archive of Ali A. Mazrui who persistently argued for
the invention of open Africanity predicated on the ‘triple heritage’ and abolition
of continental boundaries became very useful.
Who would ignore the useful work of Ngugi wa Thiong’o who has consistently
written and fought for the decolonization of the African minds and Leopold Sedar
Senghor who argued for a ‘planetary negritude’ as part of deprovincializing Africa?
The global icon Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, who introduced a new politics
founded on the ‘will to live’ rather that the ‘will to power’ as well as innovative
conception of justice predicated on the survival of both perpetrators and victims,
advanced our thinking on ‘the political’ in Africa. Oyeronke Oyewumi’s decolonial
feminist sociological work revolutionized our understanding of the problems of
using Western thought in understanding African reality and demonstrated
empirically and theoretically how the ‘woman question’ emerged as an imposition
on such societies as the Yoruba of Nigeria. Bagele Chilisa’s interventions in the
‘sacred’ field of methodology and research, boldly making a convincing case for
use of indigenous research methodologies, cannot be ignored in any work
concerned with epistemic freedom. Toyin Falola, that indefatigable African histor -
ian of our era who has researched, written and published in almost every aspect
of African society and has directly contributed to the epistemic struggles of
‘Africanizing knowledge’, cannot fail to find a space in this book.
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Because struggles for epistemic freedom are not confined to Africa, the insights
of leading African scholars are opened up to dialogue with other thinkers mainly
from the Global South and the African Diaspora such as Edward E. Said, William
E. B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, Molefi Asante, Lewis R. Gordon, Michael-Rolph
Trouillot, Ashy Nandy, Paulo Freire, Julia Suárez-Krabbe, Dipesh Chakrabarty,
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, Ramon Grosfoguel, Walter D. Mignolo, Anibal
Quijano, Edouard Glissant, Enrique Dussel, Gurminder K. Bhambra, An Yuontae,
Kuan-Hsing Chen and many others. The integration of this scholarly tradition is
inevitable because the struggles for epistemic freedom are planetary and many
African Diaspora intellectuals have contributed immensely to the advancement of
black struggles for epistemic freedom. The work of such progressive Western
scholars as Immanuel Wallerstein, Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Amy Allen and
others cannot be ignored in any book that deals with the question of epistemic
freedom. This is because they continue the tradition of critique of Eurocentrism
from inside Europe. But part of deprovincializing Africa entails avoiding pitfalls of
epistemic xenophobia, nativism and ghettoization of knowledge that characterizes
some of the previous studies that have sought to debunk the hegemony of
Euromodernist epistemologies.
The book is organized into ten thematic chapters. This introductory chapter
sets the decolonial tone for the book and opens the canvas on the meanings and
debates on ‘provincializing’ and ‘deprovincializing’ as well as ‘epistemic freedom’
versus ‘academic freedom’. Beyond the definitional scope, the chapter provides a
detailed review of some of the key epistemic challenges facing Africa today. The
chapter makes a case for the primacy of epistemic freedom within the trajectories
of decolonization. Epistemic freedom is an essential pre-requisite for other freedoms
(political, economic and cultural). While political, economic and epistemic
decolonization were inextricably intertwined, the privileging of seeking the political
kingdom that was emphasized in the decolonization of the twentieth century has
proven to be problematic unless it is underpinned by strong epistemic freedom,
which generates a necessary decolonial attitude and decolonial consciousness
needed for sustenance of political and economic freedom.
The second chapter defines the key contours of the decolonization of twenty-
first century (otherwise known as decoloniality), in the process introducing 
not only the key nomenclatures of decolonization but also fleshing out the idea
of three empires (physical, commercial–military–non-territorial and metaphysical)
that provoked three trajectories of decolonization (political, economic and epis -
temological). It proceeds to layout the three units of analysis (power, knowledge
and being) that underpin and propel decoloniality. At the same time, the chapter
brings into creative dialogue and complimentarity the decolonial ideas and concepts
cascading from different epistemic sites such as Latin America, Caribbean, Asia,
Africa and African Diaspora to enrich the epistemic struggles, which are taking a
planetary course and scope. Thus, such concepts as subaltern, African existential
philosophy, creolization, coloniality of being, coloniality of power, coloniality of
knowledge are brought into dialogue with African ones such as neo-colonialism,
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dismemberment, re-membering, delinking, moving the centre, colonialism of
special type, African personality, Negritude, Ethiopianism, Pan-Africanism and
many others.
The third chapter addresses triple issues of ontology, epistemology and pedagogy.
Its tone is philosophical as it articulates three ontological-oriented understandings
of the ‘human’ (re-humanizing, humaning and posthumanism) and their inter -
connections with epistemology. It proceeds to flesh-out a decolonial attitude as a
necessity for epistemological decolonization. Six dimensions of epistemological
decolonization (provincializing Europe while deprovincializing Africa; African -
izing knowledge; decolonial critique of existing knowledge; adding to the 
existing knowledge; ecologies of knowledges and the problematic nativist approach
to knowledge) are distilled and explained. It proceeds to explain the necessity of
decolonial pedagogy. This approach enables the chapter to delve deeper into
challenges of decolonizing teaching and learning while laying-out a re-
education/re-socialization programme predicated on decolonization of the very
normative foundations of dominant critical theory so as to ‘rethink thinking itself’
and unleashing the painstaking process of ‘learning to unlearn in order to relearn’
as a key and necessary response to colonial desocialization and dehumanizing
processes.
The fourth chapter is focused on the important theme of reconstitution of the
political as a decolonial move. Can’t we begin with a decolonial appreciation of
how the Biblical shift from the ‘old testament’ to the ‘new testament’ with Jesus
Christ of Nazareth leading the offensive against old Judaic/Abrahamic/Roman
Christendom’s inflexible laws and traditions as the key symbolic if not ecclesiastic
representation of a reconstitution of a new order entails? Eurocentric hegemonic
and imperial thought spoiled the very constitution of the political in a fundamental
way. The process of spoliation of the very constitution of the political involved
fetishism of power, which culminated in the lodging of the paradigms of difference
and war as well as the will to power into the centre of the very idea of politics.
Chapter 4 highlights what can be gained through a decolonial reconstitution
of the political. It launches reclamations of the intellectual and political thoughts
of such leading African thinkers and freedom fighters as Patrice Lumumba, Leopold
Sedar Senghor, Amilcar Cabral, Kenneth Kaunda and Nelson Mandela that are
constitutive of the decolonial/anti-colonial archive. These leading African
politicians-cum-intellectuals contributed to the transformation of the ‘constitution
of the political’ from the ‘will to power’ and the paradigm of war (homo polemos)
to the ‘will to live’. Mandela in particular emerges as a philosopher of liberation,
which is planetary in its reach as it turned-upside down such standing conception
of politics as the ‘will to power’, and worship at the altar of war (paradigm of war).
Mandela’s anti-apartheid politics inaugurated a decolonial shift from the
Nuremberg template of transitional justice predicated on criminal prosecutions to
new political justice which privileged political transformation of societies emerging
from war. While Mandela’s vision and ideas are today facing their most difficult
testing times in South Africa, they continue to be positively embraced by many
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as progressive and innovative. Chapter 4 posits that a combination of global
imperial designs and white South Africans who were never prepared to share their
colonial loot failed Mandela rather than Mandela failing to lead South Africa into
a better future. What hit Mandela’s conception of politics was its dependence on
the goodness of human beings, including those who had been irreparably corrupted
by colonialism and apartheid to the extent of falling from humanity itself.
The fifth chapter is specifically focused on the topical theme of invention 
and reinvention of Africa by Africans themselves as a key aspect of epistemic
freedom and contribution to deprovincialization of Africa. It underscores the
identity known as ‘Africanity’ as a trans-space, trans-time, trans-geographical 
and trans-cultural phenomenon. The discussion is centred on the expansive archive
of Ali. A. Mazrui. Three key areas of intervention – the invention of Africa,
contested meaning of Africanity, and the concomitant complex question of the
African condition frame the chapter. As part of Mazrui’s contribution towards
deprovincializing Africa, he introduced the concepts of ‘triple heritage’ and the
idea of the abolition of the Red Sea in his push for a new identity called ‘Afrabia’.
At the economic level, Mazrui advanced the idea of decolonizing modernity
through five processes of: indigenization, domestication, diversification, horizontal
interpenetration and vertical counter-penetration.
The sixth chapter is focused on the contributions of the Ugandan political
scientist Mahmood Mamdani to the intellectual and academic tasks of rethinking
Africa. Mamdani’s intellectual and academic work set out to establish ‘the historical
legitimacy of Africa as a unit of analysis’ and to transcend colonial historiographical
practice of writing African history ‘by analogy’. What is captured here are five
contributions to rethinking thinking on Africa by Mamdani. The first is his
decolonial approach to the study of Africa, which privileged internal historical
dynamics. The second is his analysis of how colonial power worked and how it
impinged on and shaped African resistance and generated postcolonial dilemmas.
The third is his thesis on how colonial rule invented very problematic political
identities which are today haunting contemporary Africa’s nation-building and
state-making processes. The fourth is his concept of ‘actually existing civil society’
that is opposed to the abstract/programmatic conceptions of civil society in Africa.
The fifth is his rearticulation of transitional justice beyond the traditional post-
1945 Nuremberg template. The significance of Mamdani’s academic and intellectual
interventions is that they speak directly and consistently to the long-standing
question of locus of historicization and theorization of Africa so as to liberate of
knowledge from the snares of extraversion and coloniality.
The seventh chapter focuses on understanding pre-colonial indigenous know -
ledge systems and the education systems they enabled. The case study of Ethiopian
indigenous education and the Ethiopian indigenous education system is very
important because Ethiopia is the only African country that managed to successfully
repel and resist military colonial conquest and direct colonial administration. But
at the same time Ethiopia provides an ironic if not tragic situation of a country
that was never colonized but progressively colonized itself with foreign institutions
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and ideas while dismissing its rich indigenous knowledge and even indigenous
schools. The chapter continues to articulate the long-standing but unfinished
struggles for an African university while at the same time making sense of the
African decolonial efforts aimed at reconstitution of the university across time. 
A triple genealogy of the ‘university in Africa’ emerges: namely the pre-colonial
African/Arab/Muslim intellectual tradition, the Western imperial/colonial modern -
ity and the anti-colonial nationalist liberatory developmentalism predicated on 
the idea of one country one university emerges poignantly in this chapter.
Conceptually, the chapter locates the struggles for an ‘African university’ within
the broader context of African struggles for epistemic freedom, the search for
modern African identity and autonomous African development. Its importance
lies in careful historicization of the emergence and trajectories of higher education
institutions in Africa. This task is necessary at a time of resurgent demands for
decolonization of universities in the twenty-first century, proving beyond doubt
the incompleteness of the African decolonial project.
The eighth chapter shifts the focus to the important case study of South Africa
and is specifically concerned with the unresolved national question. The rich work
of Neville Alexander and his wide-ranging ideas provided the stepping-stone and
ideal entry point into the complexities of the national question in South Africa.
What the chapter provides is a deep historicization of the national question,
tracing it from its pre-colonial lineage that is often ignored and consistently
highlighting the areas of divergence and conflict in the various imaginations of
post-apartheid South Africa. It concludes with a reflection on idea of South Africa
as a difficult liberal experiment in which the triple imperatives of the National
Democratic Revolution (NDR), decolonization and liberal constitutionalism are
in deep tension.
South Africa is chosen as a case study because it is today one of the highly
volatile sites of multiple struggles including that spearheaded by students which
demands decolonization in a country which was said to have gained political
independence in 1910. South Africa is located in a strategic region of Southern
Africa and is one of those sites that were imagined on the image of Europe despite
its location at the Southern-most tip of Africa. It is, therefore, important to
understand the very idea of South Africa and why it has been consistently generating
so many conflicts. The national question is framed by the broader intersecting
context of modernity, colonialism, decolonization and postcolonialism. The
national question is a perennial challenge in Africa in general and South Africa in
particular. It haunted colonialism (as the native question), African nationalism 
and decolonization (as a racial and colonial question), and ‘postcolonialism’ (as
nation-building and state-making). It has re-emerged today as constitutive element
of epistemological decolonization.
The ninth chapter turns to the most recent struggles for decolonization of
South African universities in particular. The chapter locates and theorizes the
Rhodes Must Fall movements within a broader context of a broader epistemic and
systemic crisis engulfing the modern world. Thus it provides details on the three
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phases of African anti-colonial protests of 1950s and 1960s; the anti-austerity and
limits of reform protests of 1980s and 1990s, and the current ‘Africa Uprisings’ as
it opens the canvas for contextualizing specific South African context mediated by
the ‘paradigm of difference’ and practices of ‘impossibility of co-presence’. As the
last outpost of the empire to shed off juridical colonialism known as apartheid,
South Africa is indeed racing against time in its attempts to decolonize power,
knowledge and being.
The university in South Africa became a key site of decolonial struggles in
2015. What began as Rhodes Must Fall targeting Cecil John Rhodes’s statue at
the University of Cape Town (UCT) quickly expanded into broader demands for
cognitive justice, change of curriculum, decommissioning of offensive
colonial/apartheid symbols, right to free, quality and relevant education, cultural
freedom, and overall change of the very idea of the university from its Western
pedigree (‘university in Africa’) to ‘African university’. Even more importantly the
demands of Rhodes Must Fall not only expanded to the centre of the empire
(Britain) where the students at the premier Oxford University also protested
against the presence of Rhodes’s statue at Oriel College. When read together with
such other movements as ‘Why is My Curriculum White?’ in the United Kingdom
and ‘Black Lives Matter’ in the United States of America, Rhodes Must Fall
became part of planetary struggles for epistemic freedom and life itself.
The tenth chapter pulls together the lines of arguments raised in this book 
and grapples with the difficult question of how can Africans create African 
futures within a modern world system structured by global coloniality as it
concludes the book. What are restated are the interconnected and intertwined
challenges of coloniality of power, knowledge and being as constitutive elements
of global coloniality that makes it difficult for Africans to create their own 
futures. It highlights that an analysis of both the constitution and workings of
modern global power is an important intellectual task because global coloniality
has direct implications on African initiatives aimed at creating African futures. 
No African futures without epistemic freedom. Decolonization of the twenty-
first century compared to that of the twentieth century has to gesture into the
future that is predicated on ‘6-ds’: deracialization, detribalization, depatriachization,
decorporatization, deimperialization and democratization.
Conclusion
Indeed the whole world is experiencing the deep and catastrophic effects of
double crisis. The crisis is both systemic and epistemic. The epistemic part has led
to the reopening of the basic epistemological question and set in motion planetary
epistemic struggles that are simultaneously unmasking what has been concealed by
Eurocentric epistemology while searching for new knowledges capable of taking
the world out of the epistemic crisis. The planetary nature of the epistemic and
systemic crisis manifested itself recently in the form of what became known as the
‘global financial crisis’. It took the world by surprise, including Europe and North
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America who have paraded themselves as alert to anything that could potentially
disturb the legacy of capitalist modernity. The crisis destabilised the epistemological
confidence of the Euro-North American world. Modern institutions such as the
banks, stock markets and the entire global financial system nearly lost credibility.
The current environmental/ecological crises rocking the modern world are
another indicator of the epistemic crisis as well as the systemic crises that remind
us of the catastrophic failures and vulnerabilities of the modern world system that
has been caught off guard. What the world is facing is a broad ‘civilizational crisis’
which loudly proclaims that modernity has produced many modern problems 
for which it has no modern solutions. Consequently, it would be naïve for peoples
of the Global South in general, and Africa in particular, to continue looking to
Europe and North America for usable knowledge, relevant ideas, critical theories
and solutions to modern problems. This is why this book calls for intensification
of African struggles for epistemic freedom as a way of rehabilitating the entire
world from the current systemic and epistemic crisis.
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